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Who Received Loans?
Home Owners’ Loan Corporation
Lending and Discrimination
in Philadelphia in the 1930s
Amy E. Hillier
University of Pennsylvania

The lending record of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) has received little
attention compared with HOLC’s residential security maps. Specifically, the extent to
which HOLC practiced racial and ethnic discrimination in the process of making and
servicing more than a million loans to homeowners during the Depression has not
been carefully examined. Using primary sources including HOLC publications, newspaper articles, 1930 census data, and mortgage records from Philadelphia, this
research shows that HOLC did make loans to African Americans, Jews, and immigrants. Evidence suggests, however, that HOLC supported racial segregation in the
process of reselling properties acquired through foreclosure.
Keywords: appraisal, geographic information systems (GIS), Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation, housing discrimination, lending, mortgage, segregation.

T

he efforts of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) to help
homeowners at risk of foreclosure during the Depression have not
been carefully studied, largely because over the past twenty years,
urban historians have shown greater interest in HOLC’s map making.
HOLC created a series of residential security maps that colored parts of cities red and deemed them “hazardous” to real estate investment. Historians
have argued that private lenders and the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) used the HOLC maps to help determine where to make loans, literally causing redlining of neighborhoods devalued by HOLC (Jackson 1985;
Mohl and Betten 1986; Mohl 1987; Cohen 1990; Massey and Denton 1993;
Hanchett 1998). Recent research challenges this causal relationship
between HOLC maps and disinvestment, concluding that the maps were
not widely distributed, lenders continued to make loans in areas colored
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red (although the interest rates were higher), and FHA and private lenders
were making their own maps and neighborhood appraisals independent of
HOLC (Hillier forthcoming).
This article focuses attention away from HOLC’s security maps and onto
HOLC’s lending record. History books written before passage of the 1968
Fair Housing Act and the 1975 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act spurred new
interest in redlining and make no mention of the maps. With few exceptions, these older sources praise HOLC as the savior of homeowners, failing
to carefully examine its lending record.1 The lack of critical research about
HOLC’s lending activities has left questions largely unanswered about who
actually received loans and whether the corporation practiced racial discrimination in this aspect of its work.
This article investigates HOLC’s lending record by analyzing a number of
primary sources, including HOLC publications, real estate and appraisal
journals, newspaper coverage, and address-level mortgage data. Using geographic information systems (GIS) technology, it analyzes the spatial distribution of a random sample of HOLC loans in Philadelphia and the personal
characteristics of loan recipients based on the 1930 U.S. Census. These
data make it possible to determine who received loans from HOLC and how
the agency did and did not practice racial discrimination. Before considering HOLC’s lending record, though, some background on the agency is
needed.

Background on HOLC
It took a major economic crisis to change prevailing attitudes about the
federal government’s role in housing. Before the Depression, the federal
government had virtually no role in any housing other than temporary
involvement in war housing during World War I. The stock market crash in
1929, followed by an unprecedented number of bank closings and mortgage
foreclosures, provided the impetus for change. In response to the crisis,
President Hoover convened a four-day Conference on Home Ownership in
December 1930 that brought together representatives from the fields of real
estate, finance, city planning, building construction, education, social
work, and government. Participants identified unstable real estate values,
low-percentage loans, short-term financing, poor appraisal practices,
uneven flow of mortgage credit, and lack of construction standards as the
underlying causes of the crisis. In response, President Hoover recommended that Congress establish a system of banks to provide credit
reserves for mortgage lending institutions comparable to the Federal
Reserve System that served commercial banks. Congress passed the Home
Loan Bank Act, creating the Home Loan Bank System, in July 1932
(Hoagland and Stone 1961).
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The Home Loan Bank System included twelve Federal Home Loan Banks
that maintained a credit reservoir for mortgage lenders including savings
and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and life insurance companies.
In addition to making loans to mortgage lending institutions, the legislation
authorized these twelve banks to make loans directly to distressed homeowners. This system ultimately proved too small, too slow, and too poorly
administered to offer a serious response to the homeownership crisis, and
the situation facing homeowners continued to worsen in the year after the
passage of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (HOLC 1944; Harriss 1951;
Jackson 1985; Allen 1950). The number of foreclosures increased every year
starting in 1926, reaching 248,700 in 1932 and 252,400 in 1933 (Abrams
1946, 42). Foreclosures peaked in the spring of 1933 at the rate of 1000 per
day when half of all homeowners in the country were behind in their mortgage payments (Jackson 1985, 193; Allen 1950, 3; HOLC 1944, 3).
In spring 1933, toward the end of his first hundred days, President Roosevelt offered a new plan for helping small homeowners. “Implicit in the legislation which I am suggesting to you is a declaration of national policy,” he
stated in his message to Congress.
This policy is that the broad interests of the Nation require that special safeguards
should be thrown around home ownership as a guaranty of social and economic stability, and that to protect home owners from inequitable enforced liquidation, in a time of
general distress, is a proper concern of the Government.

Roosevelt outlined a plan that he believed offered maximum aid to homeowners while imposing “the least possible charge upon the National Treasury” and without “injustice” to lending institutions. “Legislation of this
character,” he stated, “is a subject that demands our most earnest, thoughtful, and prompt consideration” (quoted in Bridewell 1938, 186).
Roosevelt’s proposal to help homeowners found immediate support in
the House and Senate, and Congress passed the Home Owners’ Loan Act
less than two months later. The legislation established a corporation governed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), which could
exchange government bonds for delinquent mortgages. The government
would guarantee the interest, but not the principal, on these bonds. Homeowners who lived in properties worth no more than $20,000 and housing no
more than four families were eligible for the new fifteen-year mortgages
offered at 5 percent interest.2 Congress had already passed the Emergency
Farm Mortgage Act to assist farm owners in May 1933, so this legislation
extended similar assistance to nonfarm properties. HOLC was created as a
short-term emergency measure, and the Congress set 1936 as the deadline
for new loans. In addition to providing direct support for homeowners, the
act also allowed for the creation of federally chartered savings and loan
associations to increase access to mortgage credit in certain areas.

6

JOURNAL OF PLANNING HISTORY / February 2003

HOLC officials faced an enormous challenge in creating a new bureaucracy that balanced the need to be efficient and provide assistance as
quickly as possible with the need to comply with national standards for hiring staff, appraising properties, and making and servicing loans. “The operation was a vastly larger one than this country had ever embarked on,”
explained FHLBB chairman John Fahey. “Its ramifications ran into all of
the more than 3000 counties in the United States, and nobody has ever had
experience in either setting up or operating such an enterprise” (quoted in
Bridewell 1938, 288).
Despite these challenges, the FHLBB set up the new corporation with the
same sense of urgency with which Congress had created it. Within three
months, the FHLBB had offices in the forty-eight states as well as Washington, D.C., and Hawaii, along with 208 district offices that served multiple
counties. Within another month, HOLC offices everywhere began accepting applications. All of HOLC’s policy making was centralized while the
actual operations, other than loan servicing, were decentralized (HOLC
1944; Harriss 1951). Each state had a manager who acted as the chief executive officer for HOLC in that state (HOLC 1934). When the Washington
office became overwhelmed early in its first year, HOLC created eleven
regional offices to supervise the state offices and to handle billing and collection. These state and district offices hired local attorneys and appraisers
to conduct title checks and appraisals, generally on a fee basis (Bridewell
1938). The Washington office made final decisions regarding the other
appointments, which included managers, full-time counsel, office managers, accountants, clerks, stenographers, bookkeepers, telephone operators,
and janitors, but all of these positions were filled with local job seekers
(FHLBB 1934).3 During its early years when HOLC was closing up to 80,000
loans per month, the agency had as many as 20,811 employees (HOLC
1944, 1; Harriss 1951, 5, 30).
Creating a massive new bureaucracy was the first challenge; convincing
lenders to exchange their delinquent mortgage holdings for HOLC bonds
was the second. The bonds carried 4 percent interest, had a maximum
maturity term of eighteen years, and were exempt from all taxes. Initially,
lenders were reluctant to accept them because HOLC guaranteed only their
interest, and the bonds were selling well below par. Some lenders agreed to
accept the bonds in HOLC’s first months in response to President Roosevelt’s encouragement and decisions by the New York Real Estate Securities
Exchange, Treasury Department, U.S. Attorney General, Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, and several large financial institutions that demonstrated confidence in them (Harriss 1951, 25-27). In April 1934, Congress
authorized the guarantee of the principal on the bonds, and they were soon
selling at par. Enthusiasm for the HOLC bonds increased substantially
among lenders, who started encouraging homeowners with barely delinquent accounts to apply for assistance.4
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When HOLC stopped making new loans in June 1936, staff turned their
attention to the tens of thousands of loan recipients who had become delinquent on their mortgage payments to the corporation (FHLBB 1940).
HOLC prided itself on the leniency it extended to borrowers, claiming it was
able to “bring hundreds of house holders into current standing after long
periods of serious delinquency” (FHLBB 1940, 5). Because of the long-term
nature of HOLC loans, it was in the corporation’s interest to help borrowers.
“This is not philanthropy,” explained an FHLBB publication titled Helping
the Delinquent Borrower. “This is good business, for the only profitable procedure for a lender under existing conditions is to keep the majority of its
borrowers in their homes on an economically sound basis” (FHLBB 1940,
12).
After a homeowner with an HOLC loan missed two or three consecutive
payments, HOLC sent notices, form letters, and personal letters and even
had a service representative make a home visit (Harriss 1951, 66). After listening to the borrowers’ particular situation, these “trained specialists”
were expected to develop a plan for helping them. “If they were out of jobs,
HOLC field men sought to get them employment; if they were eligible for
relief, they were aided in obtaining a shelter allowance which could be
applied on payments for their homes,” according to FHLBB. “If they were
‘overhoused’—attempting to carry homes beyond their incomes—they
were helped to rental or sale” (FHLBB 1942, 14). HOLC historian C. Lowell
Harriss likened HOLC field staff to social workers, “helping individuals and
families adjust to their own problems and to the community around them.”
In some of the files Harriss reviewed, HOLC representatives made more
than twenty visits to the same home (Harriss 1951, 67-68).
HOLC’s image of itself as lenient contrasted with the picture presented in
some of the newspaper coverage. Initially, HOLC refused to release figures
about its foreclosures, but in the face of public pressure, the agency
reported totals in the September 1936 issue of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Review. The numbers showed that “HOLC has been carrying on a vigorous foreclosure program since last March,” according to the New York
Herald Tribune. Others complained of “Shylock policies.”5 A case in which
HOLC foreclosed on the property owned by the widow of a naval hero drew
considerable media attention. Thirty years earlier, Lt. Mons Monssen had
extinguished a fire on the USS Missouri with his bare hands, and the navy
planned to name a destroyer in his honor. As a result, President Roosevelt
intervened in 1934 to expedite Mrs. Monssen’s original HOLC loan. She
appealed to Roosevelt again when HOLC threatened her with eviction for
nonpayment. But this time, the federal government was not willing to
extend special privileges to her. HOLC had an obligation to help distressed
homeowners, but the agency also perceived that it was responsible for protecting taxpayers’ money.6
In the end, HOLC foreclosed on 198,706 properties, slightly less than one
in five of its original loans. HOLC acquired the greatest number of proper-
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ties through foreclosure between June 1936 and June 1940 and sold most of
these between March 1938 and September 1941 (Hoagland and Stone 1961,
474-5). Nearly all of these sales involved financing from HOLC. HOLC
required just a 10 percent cash down payment and offered generous credit
terms because it considered these borrowers better credit risks than the
original borrowers and because it needed to compete with what the FHA
was offering at the time (Harriss 1951, 115-8).
Neither Congress nor the FHLBB intended for HOLC to become permanent. The Home Owners’ Loan Act called for HOLC “to retire and cancel the
bonds and stock of the Corporation as rapidly as the resources of the Corporation will permit.” Just how rapidly liquidation should take place became
an issue of contention. Chairman Fahey hoped that, if given enough time,
the agency could cover most of its own losses and expenses, and he saw
efforts to accelerate liquidation as a threat to HOLC’s bottom line. But by
the late 1930s, private lenders began complaining that it was time for the
federal government to retreat from the private housing market and began
lobbying Congress to authorize them to purchase HOLC’s more secure
loans (Harriss 1951). Fahey countered that private lenders had no business
profiting at the government’s expense. In his 1944 report to Congress,
Fahey criticized the small group of lenders that
seems to believe that the only purpose for which Congress established the Corporation was to take over their poor loans, enable them to put the cash received into profitable mortgages and, after the Government had spent millions in making some of these
defaulted obligations safe again, to turn them back to those who were foreclosing them
from 1933 to 1936, and leave all the losses to the Government. (HOLC 1944, 12, 14,
and 17; Harriss 1951, 174)

In the end, Chairman Fahey succeeded in fending off attempts at “forced
liquidation” and closed down the agency on his own terms in 1951 (Harriss
1951). He was in some sense vindicated when, because the interest paid by
borrowers exceeded the interest paid on bonds and the losses suffered
through foreclosures, HOLC was able to return $16 million to the U.S. Treasury (Hoagland and Stone 1961, 478).

HOLC’s Lending Record
Between 1933 and 1936, HOLC received a total of 1,886,491 applications, representing an estimated 20 percent of all owner-occupied homes in
the country and 40 percent of the mortgaged properties of eligible size and
value. HOLC spent a total of $3.1 billion on 1,017,821 loans, averaging
$3,039 per property (Harriss 1951, 1). The typical property that received
assistance was fifteen years old, two years in mortgage default, and three
years behind in taxes. HOLC made loans on properties in all but 64 of the
3000 counties in the United States (HOLC 1944, 5, 10). Ohio, New York,
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Michigan, Illinois, and Pennsylvania received the most applications and
made the most loans, with more than 100,000 applications and 50,000
loans each (Harriss 1951, 20-1, 32-3).7 Some of the states with smaller populations received a much higher number of applications in relation to the
total number of eligible properties. For example, more than eight out of ten
eligible property owners in South Dakota, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Arizona applied for HOLC assistance (Harriss 1951, 22).
Beyond this general picture, based entirely on figures produced by
HOLC, there is little information about who applied for and received HOLC
loans. Newspaper coverage in Philadelphia included personal stories of a
few loan applicants and recipients from other parts of the country, captured
in letters from desperate homeowners to President Roosevelt. One letter
explained that everyone in the household was out of work and none of them
knew what to do to prevent foreclosure. “President I wrot [sic] to you
because you the only one in this state can do something so Please use your
influence and do something for us.” Another woman wrote to President
Roosevelt after receiving a response from HOLC officials regarding her
application. “I received your litter [sic] and was glade [sic] to heere [sic]
that you won’t to help me. I don’t know haw [sic] to thank you fur [sic] your
kindness.”8 She explained that she had taken the letter from HOLC to the
building and loan association that held her mortgage, where she was told
that it was too late because her house had already been put up for sheriff’s
sale. “Please try the best you can to help me out let me no [sic] before
Thursday,” she implored, referring to herself as a “brokening [sic] hearted
mother.” These accounts offered little in the way of analysis of who was
applying for and receiving assistance, but they did personalize the work of
the HOLC bureaucracy.
The FHLBB and HOLC archives do not include information about the
characteristics of applicants or recipients. Harriss, who worked closely with
HOLC officials in writing The History and Policies of the Home Owners’
Loan Corporation (1951), had access to some information about where
HOLC made its loans that apparently has not been preserved. Based on the
characteristics of these areas, he tried to infer the characteristics of individual recipients. More recently, historians have taken advantage of loan summaries that HOLC created for certain cities that describe the location of
loans relative to the grades HOLC assigned to neighborhoods on its residential security maps. Neither of these approaches provides a means of identifying the individual characteristics of loan recipients and determining
whether the agency made loans across race and ethnicity. Given that FHA’s
and HOLC’s neighborhood appraisal standards, as expressed in HOLC’s
security maps and FHA’s Underwriting Manual, indicated that areas where
these groups lived presented risks to real estate investors, it is reasonable to
ask whether HOLC discriminated against individuals from these groups in
making its loans (Hillier forthcoming).
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In the absence of HOLC archival data or strong secondary sources about
HOLC’s loans, a sample of three hundred loans made in Philadelphia and
one hundred foreclosures where HOLC had to resell properties was
obtained from mortgage records maintained at the City of Philadelphia
Archives.9 These data include the name and address of loan recipients,
making it possible to match them with 1930 census records that include
information about the age, household composition, race, country of birth,
and occupation of household members. Using GIS, it was also possible to
map the addresses and determine the characteristics of the areas in which
HOLC made loans, including the grades HOLC assigned to the neighborhoods where it made loans. HOLC did not produce a summary of loans by
security grade for Philadelphia, so this was the only means for determining
these patterns in Philadelphia and comparing them with lending patterns in
other cities where HOLC did create loan summaries.
Because the sample is based exclusively on Philadelphia, these results
are generalizable only to Philadelphia. Nothing in sources describing
HOLC’s lending activities in other cities indicates significant differences in
application procedures or decision making about loans, but the political climate, demand for mortgages, and real estate and appraisal practices may
have differed enough across cities to lead to different lending patterns.
Who Received HOLC Loans?
Harriss (1951) has provided the only published description of the individuals and properties that received HOLC assistance. Because HOLC did
not publish this type of information, and because the manner in which the
agency filed loan records made drawing a random sample too difficult,
Harriss relied on a sample of HOLC loans made in New York, Connecticut,
and New Jersey. This region had larger average loans, newer houses, and a
higher foreclosure rate than the average property HOLC refinanced, so
Harriss’s sample is not representative but it does suggest some patterns.
Most of the loan recipients had monthly incomes between $50 and $150
and most borrowers were between thirty-five and fifty-five years old and
had dependents. HOLC did not record information about race, ethnicity, or
sex of applicants. Harriss simply noted that women did apply frequently
and husbands and wives often filed applications in both their names (pp.
51-58).
Focusing on HOLC’s lending in a single city such as Philadelphia limits
the generalizability of findings, but given the limitations of the data HOLC
collected and Harriss reported, this provides the only means for answering
questions about who did and did not receive loans. HOLC made approximately 15,000 loans in Philadelphia, 21,000 in the Philadelphia metropolitan area, and 59,000 in Pennsylvania between 1933 and 1936. This translated into approximately $37 million in assistance for Philadelphia, $56
million for the Philadelphia area, and $167 million for Pennsylvania.10 Phil-
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adelphia received far fewer loans and a smaller share of the state’s loans
than other large cities. For example, HOLC made twice as many loans in the
Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York areas and four times as many in Detroit
and Cleveland (Cohen 1990, 274). Philadelphia failed to take full advantage
of many New Deal programs, largely because it was under conservative
Republican rule during the 1930s (Coode and Bauman 1981). This may in
part explain why HOLC aided fewer people in Philadelphia than in other
large cities, although Democrats ran HOLC in the city and state, so there
are likely other reasons.11
Philadelphia received relatively few loans despite the fact that there was
tremendous demand for assistance. “There is no similar section of the
country which is so distinctly a home-owning, home-building community,
typical of the artisan group, which this new institution is designed specifically to serve,” claimed an article in the Evening Bulletin.12 Philadelphia
had a much higher homeownership rate, with more than 50 percent of
households living in owner-occupied housing compared with 36 percent for
large cities nationally (Radford 1996). Nearly 20 percent of the city’s owneroccupied households lost their properties between 1928 and 1932, a higher
proportion than in any other city (Philadelphia Housing Association [PHA]
1935, 21-22).
Foreclosures dropped by 6 percent from 1932 to 1933 and 22 percent
from 1933 to 1934, improvements that the PHA attributed to HOLC. Even
the expectation of assistance in 1933, before HOLC had made many loans,
was enough to slow foreclosures.13 But the actual numbers disappointed the
PHA. An article in the 1935 issue of PHA’s Housing in Philadelphia stated,
It was expected that the operations of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation . . . would
have had a more decided effect upon the foreclosure situation. . . . It would also be reasonable to expect that the large number of Sheriff listings over the eight-year period
proceeding would have practically exhausted the number of distressed homeowners,
but the facts disprove this.14

Not until 1937 did the annual number of foreclosed homes drop below
10,000. HOLC may have saved 15,000 properties in Philadelphia from foreclosure, but ten times that many went to sheriff’s sale between 1928 and
1938.15
The city’s failure to take full advantage of HOLC assistance came at the
same time that the Philadelphia-based American Federation of Hosiery
Workers secured federal funds available through the Housing Division of the
Public Works Administration to build the Carl Mackley Houses between
1934 and 1935. The modern multifamily complex housed union workers
and provided a fairly radical model for noncommercial housing development. The Hosiery Workers teamed up with other trade unions in the Philadelphia area to create the Labor Housing Conference in 1934 to promote
other planned housing developments for workers (Radford 1996). Philadelphia’s failure in terms of HOLC assistance came despite these progressive
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Year
1934
1935
1936
Total

HOLC Total Loans
8,433
5,363
281
14,077

Percentage of Total
59.9
38.1
2.0
100.0

Sample Loans
156
134
8
298

Percentage of Sample
52.3
45.0
2.7
100.0

housing-related initiatives and the tireless housing advocacy work of the
nationally renowned PHA (Bauman 1987).
Early newspaper coverage about loan recipients cast them as homeowners deserving assistance, not looking for charity. The Philadelphia office
approved the very first HOLC loan in the country and officials from Washington, D.C., journeyed to Philadelphia for the ceremony at which John
Flannagan and his wife, who lived at 3571 Indian Queen Lane in the East
Falls neighborhood, received their loan. The Evening Bulletin wrote of the
Flannagans,
They had the will; they had the earning power; they lacked only the opportunity for
self-help. They did not need and did not ask for anything more than reasonable facility
of credit, for which they had security that would have been ample in ordinary times.16

During the first two weeks of operation, Philadelphia’s HOLC offices provided the names, addresses, and amounts requested from loan applicants to
the newspapers. The state chairman decided to stop this practice, however,
explaining, “This is really a confidential matter and publication of the
names may make many reluctant to call for aid.”17
Newspaper coverage made no mention of discrimination in HOLC’s lending activities in these early years. The Philadelphia Tribune, the leading
African American newspaper in Philadelphia at the time, provided little
coverage of HOLC’s operations. Nothing in the coverage in Philadelphia’s
other newspapers indicate that HOLC discriminated by race or ethnicity,
national origin, or religion in making its original loans. On the contrary,
they described the pride Philadelphia’s HOLC office took in serving a variety of people. The Evening Bulletin reported that one particularly valuable
HOLC employee could speak five languages—English, Polish, Russian,
Lithuanian, and German.18
Primary mortgage data collected in Philadelphia provide much more
detailed information about loan recipients. The random sample of 300
loans made by HOLC in Philadelphia represents approximately 2 percent of
all HOLC loans in the city and largely reflects the distribution across time of
the full 15,000 loans (see Table 1). Additional information was obtained
about these properties from the Philadelphia Realty Directory and Service
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(1926-58). Almost all the homes HOLC refinanced in Philadelphia were row
houses, with an average of 1600 square feet and assessed at just under
$3,300. Loans averaged $2,700, slightly less than the national average, and
were approximately 80 percent of the assessed value.19
Of the 300 sample loans, 161 could be matched to 1930 Census records.20
Census data show that this sample included a wide range of Philadelphians.
Of the 161, 16 were “Negroes” (9.9 percent), including 15 African Americans and 1 West Indian immigrant. According to the Works Progress Administration’s (WPA’s) 1934 Real Property Survey, 8.3 percent of Philadelphia
families were “colored,” and the number increased to 10 percent in 1940,
according to the U.S. Census. These figures suggest that HOLC provided
assistance to whites and African Americans in proportion to their overall
numbers within the city. But according to the 1940 census, only 3.3 percent
of homeowners were “Negro,” so HOLC likely provided assistance to a
greater proportion of African American homeowners than to whites.21
HOLC appears also to have extended assistance to a large number of Jews.
Out of the sample of 161 loans, 18 were identified by the 1930 census as
Russian or Eastern European immigrants who spoke Yiddish or “Jewish.”
Immigrants were well represented as well. According to the 1940 census, 15
percent of all Philadelphians were immigrants, yet 76 of the sample loans
(47.2 percent) were made to foreign-born heads of household. Italians
made up the largest number within this group (28), but it also included Austrians (6), Polish (5), and Irish (4). An additional 31 were first-generation
Americans, mostly born to Irish, English, and Italian immigrants. Loan
recipients included factory workers, artisans, and professionals, several of
whom were real estate agents. Sixteen were veterans of World War I. Just 2
of the heads of household were women. The average estimated value of the
homes, according to the 1930 census, was $5,283. The average age of the
head of household in 1930 (between three and six years before receiving
the HOLC loan) was forty-six.
Where Did HOLC Make Loans?
More is known about where HOLC made loans within different cities
than who received loans, largely because of the loan summaries HOLC created for a handful of cities. Where HOLC made loans is also relevant to concerns about discrimination, since neighborhoods as well as individuals can
be the target of discrimination. Some urban historians have indicated that
HOLC practiced redlining by using its color-coded maps to avoid making
loans to the areas HOLC colored red (Massey and Denton 1993; Biles 1991).
Most, however, have recognized that HOLC made the majority of its loans
before developing the residential security maps.22 But even without colorcoded maps at its disposal, questions arise: Did HOLC practice redlining
itself? Did it avoid making loans to areas it perceived to be high risk, including areas home to African Americans and immigrants?
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Harriss (1951) reported that HOLC made 44 percent of the sample loans
from New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut in neighborhoods described
as “native white” and another 42 percent in neighborhoods described as
“native white and foreign.”23 Of the remaining loans, only 1 percent was
made in areas described as “Negro.” In an effort to explain this, Harriss
noted that most African Americans in the New York region lived in New York
City in rental housing, so they would not have been eligible for HOLC assistance (p. 53).
More recently, historians have used the loan summaries HOLC prepared
for a number of cities to determine where HOLC made loans. Jackson
(1985) reported that 60 percent of HOLC loans made between 1935 and
1936 in Essex County, New Jersey (Newark), and 68 percent of loans in
Shelby County, Tennessee (Memphis), were made to areas HOLC assigned
third (“declining”) and fourth (“hazardous”) grades on its security maps.
“HOLC did in fact issue mortgage assistance impartially,” he concludes.
“This seeming liberality was actually good business because the residents of
poorer sections generally maintained a better pay-back record than did
their more affluent cousins” (p. 202). Mohl (1987) similarly determined
that HOLC made loans to third- and fourth-grade areas in Miami, but he did
not provide specific numbers. Based on research in Chicago, Cohen (1990)
concluded that HOLC did not limit assistance to the middle class but “went
out of its way to lend to owners of small and inexpensive homes” (p. 274).
Cohen (1990, 482, note 49) and Metzger (1999) have reported that HOLC
made 60 percent of its loans in Chicago to properties in third- or fourthgrade neighborhoods. Metzger further determined that 95 percent of the
2156 HOLC loans made in the vicinity of Chicago’s downtown Loop were
made on properties in neighborhoods given fourth-grade ratings (p. 157,
note 15).
HOLC prepared loan summaries for only a handful of cities.24 In addition
to Memphis, Essex County, and Chicago—the places studied by Jackson
(1985), Cohen (1990), and Metzger (1999)—this included Atlantic City,
New Jersey, and New Orleans, Louisiana. In Atlantic City, almost 45 percent of HOLC’s loans were located in first-grade (“best”) and second-grade
(“still desirable”) areas, while 40 percent were in third-grade areas and just
14 percent were in fourth-grade areas.25 In New Orleans, less than 2 percent
of loans were in first-grade areas and 9 percent were in second-grade areas,
while nearly 45 percent were made to third-grade areas and 38 percent
were in fourth-grade areas.26
Because HOLC did not prepare a loan summary for Philadelphia, the
sample of three hundred HOLC loans were geocoded using the street
address listed on the mortgage instrument to determine where HOLC made
loans in the city.27 The majority of loans were in West, South, and North
Philadelphia. Controlling for the total number of owner-occupied proper-
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Owner-Occupied Units

Section

n

%

n

%

Odds Ratio

Far Northeast
Near Northeast
Olney/Oak Lane
Germantown/Mt. Airy
Roxborough/Manayunk
Upper North Philadelphia
Lower North Philadelphia
Frankford/Kensington
Center City
West Philadelphia
Southwest Philadelphia
South Philadelphia

1
21
21
12
7
19
52
16
2
51
20
78

0.3
7.0
7.0
4.0
2.3
6.3
17.3
5.3
0.7
17.0
6.7
26.0

997
23,274
23,585
14,152
4,951
18,712
22,087
19,349
1,441
27,250
10,926
29,422

0.5
11.8
12.0
7.2
2.5
9.5
11.2
9.8
0.7
13.8
5.5
14.9

0.7
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.9
0.7
1.5
0.5
0.9
1.2
1.2
1.7

Note: These areas correspond to contemporary planning analysis sections as defined by the Philadelphia City Planning Commission. The boundaries of the 1940 census tracts largely fell along the boundaries of the planning analysis sections. In cases where they did not, the tract totals were added to the section that contained more than half the area. The odds ratio reflects the number of Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation (HOLC) loans per owner-occupied unit relative to the citywide rate. Odds ratios less than
one indicate that areas had fewer loans per units while odds ratios of one or greater indicate that areas
had more loans per units.

ties, these areas still received a disproportionate number of HOLC loans
(see Table 2).28
Data from the 1934 WPA Real Property Survey and 1940 U.S. Census
indicate that the areas where HOLC made loans had less expensive housing, more racial and ethnic diversity, and slightly older and more crowded
housing than typical areas. The average housing value for census tracts
where HOLC made loans was $3,913, well below the city average of $5,539.
Tracts averaged 11.4 percent “Colored,” compared with a city average of
8.5 percent, and twenty-three of the three hundred HOLC loans went to
tracts where more than half the residents were “Colored.” Sixteen percent
of residents were white immigrants, compared with a city average of 13 percent (see Figure 1). Less of the housing needed repairs (5.2 percent compared with 10.1 percent), but housing was older, on average (34.7 years old
compared with 30.3 years old) and there was more overcrowding (15.1 percent compared with 12.7 percent).
The loans were also mapped against a digitized version of the 1937 residential security map for Philadelphia to determine the grades of the areas
where HOLC made loans (see Figure 2).29 Rather than avoiding neighborhoods it later deemed hazardous, HOLC made most of its loans in Philadelphia in fourth-grade areas. This pattern was consistent with the loan summaries HOLC prepared for other cities, but the numbers in Philadelphia
provide even more dramatic evidence that HOLC directed assistance to
neighborhoods considered risky. HOLC made more than 60 percent of the
loans to areas later given fourth-grade ratings and another 18 percent of
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Figure 1:

Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) Loans by Percentage African American and
Immigrant

loans to areas given third-grade ratings. The size of the average loan in these
areas was much smaller than loans made in areas given first- and secondgrade ratings, but the properties were also less expensive (see Table 3).
How Did HOLC Deal with Foreclosing and Reselling Properties?
Foreclosing on properties where HOLC loan recipients failed to make
their payments and selling off those properties constituted a distinct part of
HOLC’s operations. Did HOLC practice discrimination at these stages, and
did areas considered hazardous prove greater credit risks to HOLC? Secondary sources provide some information about foreclosure patterns. The
address-level mortgage data collected in Philadelphia make it possible to
further consider these questions. Matching the sample of three hundred
original loans to information in the Philadelphia Realty Directory and Service (1926-58) showed that twenty-nine of the loan recipients eventually
lost their homes to HOLC. By sampling just the loans made after 1936 in the
HOLC mortgage index at the City of Philadelphia Archives (loans that by
definition were part of reselling foreclosed properties since HOLC stopped
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Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) Loans by Residential Security Map Grade

HOLC Grade

Loans

First (“best”)
Second (“still desirable”)
Third (“declining”)
Fourth (“hazardous”)

5
46
63
186

Percentage
of Sample
1.7
15.3
21.0
62.0

Average
Loan ($)
3,936
3,933
2,536
2,089

Average
Assessed Value ($)
4,833
4,940
3,284
2,877

making loans on new properties in 1936), a sample of an additional one
hundred foreclosures was collected. These foreclosures were much more
difficult to match with the 1930 census data, so the individual characteristics of heads of household who lost their homes to HOLC are not known.
However, by mapping them, it was possible to determine the characteristics
of areas where HOLC foreclosed on properties.
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Tract-Level Characteristic
Median housing value ($)
White immigrant (%)
Colored families (%)
Owner occupied (%)
Negro owner occupied (%)
Housing in need of repair (%)
Overcrowded (%)
Median age of housing (years)
Median duration of residence (years)

City Average

Original Loans

Foreclosures

5,539
13
8.5
45.1
4
10.1
12.7
30.3
6.2

3,913
16
11.4
46
6
5.2
15.1
34.7
6.4

4,211
13
13.4
41.5
8
5.2
12.6
38.3
6

Source: Data are from the 1934 Works Progress Administration Real Property Survey with the exception
of percentage white immigrant, percentage Negro owner occupied, and median housing value, which
come from the 1940 U.S. Census.

Based on the sample of loans in the New York region, Harriss (1951)
reported that the foreclosure rate varied little across income groups, but
those receiving larger loans were more likely to default. Families with lower
incomes and more dependents had lower foreclosure rates, while older borrowers had higher foreclosure rates. Supporting this general pattern, Jackson (1985) reported that homeowners in poorer areas were more likely to
repay their loans. The HOLC loan summaries for Atlantic City, New
Orleans, and Chicago show less consistent results. In Atlantic City, 57 percent of loans in “D” (red) areas were more than ninety days delinquent,
compared with 48 percent in “C” (yellow) areas and 44 percent in “A”
(green) and “B” (blue) areas. In Kansas City, “D” areas also had higher foreclosure rates than the other three. The delinquency rates in Chicago, on the
other hand, were remarkably similar across HOLC grades and the metropolitan area, hovering around 60 percent.30 Delinquencies did not necessarily lead to defaults and foreclosures. Both delinquency and foreclosure rates
reported in these summaries were based only on properties that HOLC
owned or where the agency had outstanding mortgages at the time the summary was completed. Taken together, the data are inconclusive, verifying
only that “D” areas were not consistently poorer risks for HOLC.
Mapping the sample of 129 foreclosures in Philadelphia indicates that the
geographic distribution of foreclosures was similar to the distribution of the
original 300 loans. Foreclosures tended to be located in areas with slightly
more expensive but older housing, with slightly lower percentages of white
immigrants and higher percentages of African Americans and homes owned
and occupied by African Americans than areas where the original loans
were made (see Table 4). But while there were many more foreclosures in
fourth-grade areas, the areas with better grades actually had higher foreclosure rates (see Table 5).

Hillier / WHO RECEIVED LOANS?

Grade
First
Second
Third
Fourth

Foreclosures
2
16
36
75

Percentage of
All Foreclosures
1.5
12.3
27.7
57.7
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Percentage of
All Loans in Grade
20.0
8.7
14.3
8.6

While HOLC does not appear to have avoided making loans to African
Americans, Jews, and immigrants or to neighborhoods with concentrations
of African Americans and immigrants, the agency did avoid making loans to
African Americans in white areas. Charles Abrams (1955, 247) noted the
discrimination HOLC practiced in the reselling of foreclosed properties:
“When loans were made, the policy was to respect segregation and encourage it.” His contention is supported by reports from Detroit and Philadelphia. In Detroit, HOLC refused to sell a particular house to African American civil rights activist Snow Grigsby, leading him to join with others from
Detroit who were concerned about racial discrimination by HOLC in protesting against the agency in Washington (Thomas 1992).
At least one resident of Philadelphia had a similar experience. In May
1943, an African American man who was a first lieutenant with the army
filed suit against HOLC in federal court for refusing to sell him a property on
a predominantly white block in West Philadelphia. Warren Drake and his
pregnant wife offered to purchase a house at 134 North 50th Street, a block
where all of the residents were white but one property had been sold to an
African American family that had not moved in yet. HOLC rejected Drake’s
first offer and accepted his second but asked for some time so that “repercussions would not be so great.” Drake’s broker insisted on securing a sale of
agreement, leading HOLC to refuse Drake’s offer.31 HOLC settled the suit
less than two weeks after Drake filed it. In a moment of triumphant optimism, Drake’s agent stated,
This incident should serve as a warning to other finance companies, who although
they have not been hauled to court, are as guilty of such practice as the Home Owners’
Loan Corporation. In short, it is a move to thwart attempts under way to establish colored ghettos in this country.32

This racial steering was not official HOLC policy. The agency relied on local
brokers to sell off their properties, and these brokers, in turn, followed local
practices in their work for HOLC. But HOLC’s lack of a policy or concern
with the practices of the brokers carrying out its work was in effect an
endorsement of segregation and racial discrimination.
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Conclusion
The story of HOLC involves much more than the questions of to whom it
made loans, what types of neighborhoods they lived in, and whether the
corporation practiced discrimination. HOLC was involved in establishing
new standards for residential appraisals, mortgage terms, and home
improvements, and its efforts paved the way for the creation of a federally
supported secondary mortgage market. Beyond the help HOLC gave homeowners, it provided much needed assistance to lenders whose assets were
frozen and municipalities with unpaid real estate taxes. In fact, some have
argued that HOLC was primarily concerned with helping lenders rather
than homeowners (Abrams 1946; Bartelt 1993).
The issue of discrimination is the focus of this research largely because of
the attention HOLC’s residential security maps have received in recent
years. Recent research has challenged the argument that HOLC’s maps
caused redlining because private lenders used the maps to avoid making
loans to the fourth-grade areas that HOLC colored red (Hillier forthcoming). But whether HOLC practiced redlining while making its own lending
record is a separate question. There is substantial evidence to indicate that
private lenders and the federal government practiced housing discrimination (Sugrue 1996; Yinger 1995; Bradford 1979). Urban historians point to
the disinvestment in central cities, high levels of racial and economic segregation, and disparities in housing quality and homeownership across race
in the second half of the twentieth century as the result of earlier redlining
(Metzger 1999, 2000; Goering and Wienk 1996; Squires 1992; Jackson
1985). The question then is, just how did redlining and mortgage discrimination occur? This analysis of HOLC’s own lending indicates that the corporation supported racial segregation and practiced discrimination in
reselling the properties it acquired through foreclosure. But address-level
mortgage data in Philadelphia confirm what aggregate HOLC data suggested: the agency did not avoid making loans to African Americans, Jews,
or immigrants or to neighborhoods where they lived. Therefore, efforts to
demonstrate how redlining and mortgage discrimination took place must
look to private lenders and federal agencies other than HOLC—particularly
the FHA—to understand how that discrimination took place.

1. The works of Charles Abrams—The Future of Housing (1946) and Forbidden Neighbors
(1955)—are the exception to sources on the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) in that they are
very critical of the agency. The most comprehensive source of information about HOLC, and the only
book dedicated to its history, is C. Lowell Harriss’s 1951 The History and Policies of the Home Owners’
Loan Corporation. Harriss wrote his book with the cooperation of HOLC staff and is never critical of
HOLC. The 1961 edition of Henry Hoagland and Leo Stone’s text, Real Estate Finance, dedicated nine
pages to HOLC. Like Harriss’s book, this text is very complimentary of HOLC and never mentions
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financial institutions to begin to return to the mortgage-lending business.” See Arthur Schlesinger, The
Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), 298. See also John
Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody, eds., The New Deal: The State and Local Levels (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1975), 161; Paul K. Conkin, The New Deal (New York: Thomas Y.
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See Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) (1942, 12).
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12 June 1933, George D. McDowell Philadelphia Evening Bulletin Newsclipping Collection, Philadelphia, Temple University Libraries, Urban Archives [hereafter, McDowell Collection], HOLC card 3;
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Thomas H. Coode and John F. Bauman (1981).
The HOLC office in Philadelphia was also plagued by charges of fraud in 1933 and 1934, covered
extensively by the Evening Bulletin. See “Racketeers Invade Home Loan Field,” Philadelphia Inquirer,
29 July 1933, p. 3, col. 2; “Officials Warn Loan Racketeers,” Evening Bulletin, 28 June 1933, p. 6.
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